Biao Yang

Prof., Department of History, East China Normal University (Shanghai, China)

History Education as a Way for Peace in East Asia

I. A Pattern of Conflicts

An important aspect of history education is to solve the conflict of concepts. In recent decades, there is an increasing tension in the relationship of East Asia countries. Nationalism has become popular in the region. No compromise has been reached for the history textbook and Yasukuni Shrine issues. East Asia tends to become another Middle-East in terms of clash of historical concepts. The main reason for the situation is that these countries hold different view towards historical events, and disputation over historical memory in East Asia becomes a pattern of conflicts, and a kind of peace without security.

The root of peace crisis in East Asia lies in its «disunity» – a fatal weak point of East Asian society. From the historical perspective of its modern development, this «disunity» is not a born characteristic, but a cultivated feature. East Asia belonged to the culture circle of Confucianism. Under the influence of this common culture, close ties between nations were formed. Gradually a unique form of civilization and a social system with China once as the centre were established. However, in modern times, the integral social structure nurtured by the common culture and the stable social system was damaged under the impact of western civilization. The declination of China, the westernization of Japan, and the invasion of western powers shattered the traditional system of East Asia, which further threatened its cultural integrity. The rise of Japan broke up the original structure of East Asia. Japanese invasion and colonization incurred strong objection and antipathy from its conquered neighbours. Consequently, the original spiritual and emotional bond in East Asia society broke up. After the World War Two, with the «Iron Curtain» stretching to East Asia, a «Bamboo Curtain» was formed, which divided the East Asia society into groups. As a result, the integral social structure formed in the long historical evolution was shattered into pieces. The destruction of social system, emotional bond and social structure has transformed an integral East Asia into dispersive pieces1.

Therefore, in recent decades, while we are amazed by the economic miracles of East Asia, we can observe its innate paradox – the paradox between integrity and disunity. Integrity refers to the common value innate in the core history and core tradition of East Asia society. The pushing power of Confucianism towards the modern development of East Asia shows that modern East Asian countries still share this intrinsic integrity and benefit a lot from common culture. However, in contemporary East Asia, this integrity cannot counterbalance the disunity. «Disunity» means the diversity or disparity in social structure despite the common ground shared by East Asia countries. It also refers to the disparity in terms of concept and spirit, especially the confrontation of historical concept and disparity of ideology. Integrity is the driving force of the mutual development of East Asia society whereas disunity hinders East Asia from exercising its influence in worldwide scope. The smashing effect caused by the confrontation of historical concept not only reveals the inherent weakness in East Asia, but also sets obstacle towards its future peace. Thus certain core power as the driving force is a must for the combination of East Asia society. The integration of European community has set a good example in this regard.

East Asian countries can be called «Familiar Strangers». We Asians tend to look up to the so-called western civilization while look down upon the nearest neighbours. The continuous civilization that can not even be cut off by the warfare is now endangered by our dispute on history. We forget the most beautiful thing in Asia. Asian civilization can be summarized as «Love and Peace». As a Japanese historian Tenshin Okakura in the 20th century put it, Asia is an integral part. The Himalayas set two great civilizations apart – Chinese civilization featured by the collectivism of Confucian and Indian civilization featured by the individualism of Buddhism. But this «snow curtain» cannot prevent the expansion of universal love pursued by Asian nations. It is this universal love that creates the most important religions in the world. Persian poems, Indian thoughts and Chinese morality all tell the love for peace in Ancient Asia. It manifests the important role that common historical concept plays in the peace process of East Asia. It strengthens the friendship between nations and combines people together.

East Asia has good foundation for future development. The key is to go out of «disunity» and to form effective regional advantage through combination of innate power. Thus, East Asia can maintain its stability and security by its own regulation and cooperation rather than by external forces. This regional advantage will turn out to be powerful once it is attained. It will push the whole East Asia forward and more importantly, enhance the all-round development in economics, society, politics and culture. Therefore, East Asian countries should adopt strategic measures especially strategic concept to strengthen the cultural exchange between each other and to explore the «Common Value» that supports the future development. The integrity of history and culture is an important source for the establishment of regional advantage. In this regard, it needs to broaden the scope of cultural exchange and explore the historical source in the whole East Asia in order to establish common concept and basic value. The integrity of the core value in history and culture is the basis for the peaceful development and the establishment of the regional advantage of East Asia.

II. Contrasting Historical Memories

From the perspective of a Chinese researcher, Chinese historical memory is featured by optimism. China has the characteristic that her history is likely to be romanticised. People from the other countries would be confused by the glory that the Chinese see in failures. Although China suffered a lot from splits, defeats and invasions of foreign powers, Chinese are still proud of its past as a big country. And this pride very often becomes a yardstick for them to measure the world history. In the very era when nationalist thoughts are widely popularised day by day, it is truly through collective memories that Chinese structure their world and understand their past. Thus, memory of the history is romanticised and viewed with optimism.

Conversely, in evident contrast with China, the memory of history in Japan, is characterised by a strong realism and is greatly pessimistic. The realistic and indefinite nature of the war memory in Japan embraces the particular attributions concerning the history and ideology. It is necessary for us to get a better understanding of the Japanese memory of war in its social and historical contexts. The consciousness about the responsibility for the war of the Japanese masses is pegged directly to how they face up to the political incentives and economic demands of the future; these are caused by the changes within international relations as well as by the campaigns for compensation from the region. On the other hand, the Chinese renders emotional reminiscence as the significant inner sources in the memory of history; there is only the ideological essence the memory has to shoulder, rather than the complicated international political relationships with which Japan has to meet. After the 1980s, pronounced changes occurred to the mentality of the Japanese regarding the memory of war history as well the responsibility for the war. This was because the process of examination and approval of history textbooks in Japan had aroused strong criticism among the countries in East Asia from the summer of 1982. In that year, some Japanese history textbooks changed the word 'invasion' of Asian countries to 'got in and out' in the content of the Second World War history. What's more, such issues were re-kindled as later editions of history textbooks occurred every four years in Japan. In addition, in the 1990s, law suits and claims by the comfort women, forced labourers and prisoners of war for compensation from Japan received immense media focus. Confronted with the issue of responsibility as an offender, questions of morality and human rights began to inform Japanese consciousness of their responsibility for the war; moreover, their memory about the war appeared to be seriously split. Therefore, we can see that the severe international political atmosphere has promoted changes in historical memory within Japanese society as a whole. However, on the plane of politics, these changes are sometimes the transferred versions of the policy dominated by a pragmatic philosophy. It was also proposed that the Japanese government should build a secular war memorial. At such a memorial, visitors would not have to be concerned with the ideological and religious connotations of visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which is dedicated to those who died in Japan's conflicts, including Class-A war criminals. However, this proposal was rejected to avoid an internal LDP party feud before a party presidential election2. In some Chinese understanding, the Japanese Government has weakly admitted responsibility for the war and rendered only a minimal apology. This might reduce the diplomatic pressures and meet the needs of maintaining the leading role in Asia as a strong political power, rather than deepening of the historical realisation within the Japanese3. Therefore, at the very time when changes occurred in the international environment, and domestically, the thoughts of the Japanese society as a whole towards the issue of responsibility regarding the war might be in stagnation or even reversed in direction. There was no feeling of the historical memory being romanticised as enjoyed by Chinese.

Despite the current 'History Wars' in East Asia, the comparison between Japan and China shows that in the present many Chinese can reconstruct their historical memories regardless of its past failure; while Japan has broken away less from its past. Several wartime factors still exist in post-war Japan to some extent. Although the 'Tenno' or Emperor system is very different now, it is still a basic structure of Japanese society, which cannot be ignored and can be understood easily through seeing how ordinary Japanese acquire personal security by not conflicting with others in daily life. It is hard for Japanese to impute the war to their Tenno as post-war Germans have done with Hitler. Unable to make a break with the past, the Japanese still live in the shadow of their past, suffering from the historical pressures and blame. German criticism regarding past war history is less often perceived as a fundamental criticism of the current state, while Japanese criticism of national history is sometimes seen as unacceptable criticism of the state itself. The inseparable relations with the old era make it hard for the Japanese to condemn their history which is still related to their life to the core. Even now, the Japanese government's recognition of their responsibilities regarding the war, and the ways in which it recognises this responsibility, result from contemporary political concern, not from the intensifying of its war memories, since behind the memories there are complex and countless problems which refer to the future ways for Japan as a nation.

Being an island country, Japan did not suffer much, comparing with China, from exterior military menace throughout its history; therefore, it did not resort to centralisation or huge bureaucratic organisation as China did. Local governments stood out as the most effective pattern of administration in Japanese history and, through centuries of cultural evolution, a compact underlying social structure has taken shape. Public morality, permeated within individual businesses, serves as a potential force, which goes diametrically against the bureaucracy's pursuit for superficial splendour in China4. As a result, while Chinese blamed the 'Foreign Powers' for losing the wars during the modern time, the Japanese viewed their defeat as the failure of the whole nation. The degree to which the nation, its people and its army are unified is the key difference that lies between Japan and China. Japanese war memory reflects a thinking mode based on the framework which emphasises an integrated nation and in which every member involved is placed under obligation. That accounts for the sense of perplexity and unyieldingness that Japanese war memory has left with us. Today, when globalisation, though vagueness in definition, has become the suitable word for almost all contexts, war memory reminds us that Nation and Peoples are not simply an academic concept or notion of ideology. War memory is, in the first place, «a record of emotion»5, which determines that we should not only discuss the issue in a logical way but also need to approach historical memory from a national character and traditions perspective.

In terms of national character, or culture, the confidence and formality revealed in Japanese culture definitely have their roots back in the history. More traces of idealism can be found within Japanese culture in which people and things are expected to be perfect while Chinese prefer to be leisured and stay out of each other's business, positively lacking the Japanese desire for perfection. Moreover, coming into the modern age, the Japanese sense of superiority continued to expand, insinuating itself into the minds of the whole nation, from leaders to the public. It is the sense of superiority, as sub-consciousness in modern Japanese historical memory, which backed the bloody wars and increased the gap between the East Asian countries and Japan. The Second World War, in a sense, is still going on not so much because many of the participants are still alive but because some factors that once triggered the war have not yet been eliminated. Therefore, the effort to make the war part of our historical memory and to draw knowledge out of it is by no means the only way to understand the war. What we have to admit that the gap between the ways in which different peoples view the war history is, above all, not one of knowledge, but of emotion. Post-war Japanese public historical memory has been dominated by the victim complex. Contrary to Germans' understanding of the Second World War that focused on Auschwitz and other concentration camps, Japanese understanding of the war largely stressed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima rather than Pearl Harbor. Sometimes, Japanese post-war historical memory seems similar to that of Germany after the First World War. Being the second largest country in terms of economy, yet with a disproportionate international status, Japan, with its proud people who consider themselves to be the descendants of a divine emperor, is certainly not satisfied. Isn't it true that conservatives and ultra-nationalists on the right of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) support an effort to change history? Specifically, they want to change Japan's role as a defeated nation, which has abandoned military action in its post-war constitution, so that it can resort to force at will just like America and Britain. Despite the dissidence of a continuing and strong peace movement in Japan, this may be the very problem we are currently faced with.

The issue of Japanese war memory should also be put into the globalisation frame, including the historical plane, for better understanding. In fact, it would be possible for us to get deeper insight into the historical memory in Japan by locating it with the political and cultural logic of globalisation. Frankly speaking, globalisation is the internationalisation of Western civilization. From an historical aspect, the «globalisation» campaign «in essence is the continuation of Western expansion over the past 500 years»6. In a certain sense, Japan, such an ancient Asian country alienated geographically from the West's arena, actually has already become the successful in the practice of the inner logic of Western expansion for launching wars and becoming an economic giant. In the Second World War Japan intended to establish, what was called, 'the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', by means of war, which was for the purpose of not only extending the Japanese nation itself but also taking full possession of the resources and wealth of Asia as a whole. That is the great truism of the certain material logic involved in the globalisation7. Another essential meaning of globalisation is to eliminate the abstraction and difference contained in the different regional and domestic cultures. Meanwhile, globalisation also seeks to remove from their pedestal the historical epics which differentiated the various nations. Historical epics only belong to a traditional society; whereas a modern memory and narrative of wars, with its characteristics of racialism and nationalism, actually can be regarded as a reflection of the logic of economic exploitation symbolising colonialism; furthermore, the giant wheel of global capitalism lies behind such stories.

It is necessary to place the issue of Japanese war memory in a much broader background, the framework of modern history of colonialism, rather than restrict it within the range of Japanese nationality. Here, we might come to a conclusion that in essence, as a result of the collision between America and Japan in the Pacific and Asia during the Second World War, post-war America has taken up a role similar to that of pre-war Japan as far as their influence in Asia and the layout of colonies in the region are concerned. As a matter of fact, America turned Korea and Japan into occupied countries and to a degree colonised the region. Since this contemporary structure of colonialism has never been challenged, it is in reality impossible to censure the history of colonialism. Then how could it be possible for Japan to reflect on its history of colonialism in the real sense within a new colonial system?8 In the Age of Globalisation, only by connecting the already broken chain of colonial historical memory can we resume the necessary vision for understanding Japanese war memory.

For the issue of historical memory, although we are disputing the past, it is the future peace that we are really concerned about. Therefore, we should seek solution for the future rather than confining our dispute in certain events of certain period. The future of Asia should not be ripped by the past. We shall transcend national hatred and face the problem for the sake of future peace and development in East Asia. The principle of equality and rationality should be observed, because if we go from one extreme to another, the future peace in East Asia can not be realized.

III. National Legacies: 'Asia' and the 'West'

China and Japan, two major East Asian countries with long national history, both started to re-construct themselves, in the shadow of Western, from the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, China seemed an increasingly feminised and inactive culture at a time when Japan was taking a sternly masculinising path. These two countries had different historical views in the process of self-transformation. To Chian, Asia was regarded as her mother-continent, and China, thus, can indisputably follow the track of the Eastern historical traces. Nevertheless, as for Japan in the modern history, she was confronted with confusion over whether she should separate herself from the rest of Asia as her mother-continent when launching the process of movement onto Western tracks.

Just like the issues concerning globalisation, the conception of 'Asia' is also hard to define. Asia is not only a political concept but also a cultural one, at the same time; it is both a geographic notion and a criterion of value judgment. In a quite long historical period, Asia is not just a geographical idea on a self-sufficient basis; it is often regarded as a vertical ideological image absolutely opposed against Europe.

In terms of history, the thoughts of modern Japanese have featured two orientations while contemplating the Asian issues, both articulated during the nineteenth century modernisation of Japan. One of the representative views is the theory, 'Leave Asia and join Europe', led by Yukichi Fukuzawa, one of the shapers of Meiji Restoration Japan from the 1870s; the other is 'Asia is one', led by Tenshin Okakura. Yukichi Fukuzawa held the idea that Japan should distance itself from her 'bad neighbour members' in Asia, such as China and Korea, so as to be listed together with those powerful giants in the West. It argued that divorce from Asia, just like the process of historical development in Europe, which has got rid of the influence exerted by the Islamic civilization, was essential. The historical development of Japan also exposed its 'leaving Asia' process; as it had earlier moved away from the impact of Chinese civilization, now it should pursue the European civilization rather the Asian one. On the other hand, Tenshin Okakura, the art critic and historian, argued that Asian civilization offered the world a 'Love' and 'Beauty' that is beyond that of the European; in that sense, Asian civilization possesses values to which the European would have no access. Unlike China, modern Japan was faced with a problem that was intrinsically complicated. Japan was seeking all the time to transcend its lower national status position that had existed for several thousand years in East Asia, as being subject to China while competing with Korea. Direct response with the West might re-arrange the international order in the East Asian region.

In the meantime, Japan was obliged to face the situation of racial categories, which were then regarded as an advantage of the Western sphere. Being categorised as a coloured race, it would be impossible for Japan, to emerge into Western alignment, as she could not participate in the international affairs on the world arena beyond her Asian essence. Should Japan either get out of or seek to rejuvenate Asia? In other words, the central question is whether Japan is a member of Asia and whether she is responsible to Asia. In the modern history of Japanese ideology, this is a changing duet being performed ubiquitously. Moreover, those are also the two centres of the ellipse symbolising the historical memory of Japan, and continually release political and cultural energy even now.

In modern times, the 'leaving Asia' tendency in Japan led to hostility towards the Asian continent and to contempt for its Asian neighbouring nations. Subconscious attitudes of this kind were amongst the ideological factors contributing to Japan's wars against Asian countries and are an important reason for its distortion of the war memory. After World War Two, Japan reconsidered its position in the world pattern, but all the same unable to go beyond Asia to face the world at large directly. One crucial problem is, whether Japan, defeated in war, should be responsible for Asia or not? How the shadows in Japanese views of Asia could be wiped after the war, which has superposed the aggressive imperialism since last century? Such problems as to how Japan should deal with Asia and if the Japanese are a special people in Asia still deeply influence the Japanese memory of history.

It was from the late twentieth century that Japanese culture prospered, when cultures around the globe were blending, rather than in the nineteenth century, the era of new imperialism, when the nationalism movement was under way. Just through the profound blending on a large scale, Japanese culture could reveal its unique character, becoming an individual member of the cultures of the world. Therefore, the continuing patterns, and historical fundamentals, demonstrated in the positioning of Japan in Asia concern the reconstruction of historical memory and the establishment of a new conception of global history.

From the perspective of world history, China and Japan are closely bonded. While we are discussing how Japanese interpret history, it is necessary for Chinese to understand Japanese culture and society in rational way. In modern times, Chinese paid special attention to Japan in that they could understand the West through Japan and follow its suit. Nowadays, Chinese admire western civilization as Japan did in Meiji period while neglecting Japanese culture. Nationalism is one of the reasons. In the times of diversity, East Asian countries should hold open attitude toward other cultures so as to truly understand the other's historical memory. Thus future peace can be foreseen.

IV. The Prospect of East Asian History Education for Future

Entering the new century, history education in East Asia is faced with new situation and tasks.

Firstly, the developing trend of East Asian society in the twenty-first century is internationalization and informalization. Information and knowledge will be the main driving force for social development. The main task of education is to improve students' creativity and personality. History education should more responsibilities than it did in the past.

Secondly, from 1980s, especially China has gradually shaken off the mode of agriculture society. And in 1990s, industrialization has spread out the whole nation. At the turning point to the new century, information age begins to take shape. The quality demanded for human resource in future society will be quite different from the one in nowadays society. Correspondingly, history education, as an important part in civics education, has to change and develop.

Thirdly, with the development of East Asian society, there will no longer be a unanimous and centralized educational policy and criteria. Education in East Asia will focus more on self-development rather than controlling. Different levels of local institutes will have more rights of making policy that meet local demands, which provides more room for the further development of history education.

Faced with new situation and tasks, reviewing the past of history education in East Asia, we should have new orientation for future one.

Firstly, mutual understanding between different nations and countries play a decisive role in the process of globalization and culture plurality. And history education serves as the basis of mutual understanding and respect. Therefore, it must strengthen this function and eliminate stereotypes and bias in past teaching. Thus, history education can serve as an important means to deepen the understanding and cooperation between different nations and areas for a new citizenship.

Secondly, human beings should become the centre of history education instead of the knowledge study itself. And there is an increasing appeal for individuality. History courses should meet this demand. Traditional history teaching emphasize more on the right choice of content, the completeness of scientific principles and academic system of the discipline than the important theme of people. The core of history education theory in the future should be about how to combine the development of individuals with the content of study. Learners should be put at the centre of the theory and thus become a qualified citizen.

Thirdly, future history education in East Asia should guide students from memorizing information towards creating something new. We should develop not only students' memorizing capacity but also their independent thinking, analysing and self-evaluation and self-orientation.

Last but not least, history education should reflect urgent issues of the region and peoples' demand, so students will be able to foresee future tasks and understand current situation through historical analysis. History education should reveal the past experience as well as the prospect of the epoch rather than stay away from current problems and dangers we are faced with. Students should be encouraged to put historical knowledge and interpretation into solving future problems. They should understand all kinds of possibilities and undertake their responsibilities for a shared culture through history study.

Peace education should be introduced into history education system in East Asia. History education is more than giving historical knowledge and developing analysis skills. Another important element in history education is to advocate peace concept. Peace education that is lacked in East Asia should be carried out from elementary schools, middle schools to universities in the area. The main method is to impart peace concept in history education. Conflict between individuals, groups and nations is an inevitable topic in history course. Thus how to evaluate and understand those conflicting events is a good issue for peace education for the region. In terms of teaching task and objective of history course, the following items should catch attention of history educators in East Asia:

A. the basic task of history course should be to give students historical knowledge that enables them to feel the progressing steps of the world. Thus students are encouraged to create better life and to make their own contribution to the peaceful development of the world.

B. history courses should enable students to understand problems and events in the transformation period. Under the guidance of teaching, students can discuss domestic history as well as foreign history in order to have a better understanding of their own country. Besides, students shall get to know the common cultural heritage shared by all the nations.

C. one of the basic objectives of history course should be to overcome bias so as to better understand the problems and features of other races, nations and communities.

D. the following four items should be carried out in the designing of teaching programs of history courses.

(1) Keeping balance between domestic history, world history and local history.

(2) Guiding students to know more of other cultures different from domestic culture.

(3) Providing opportunities for further study of peace and war in certain historical periods.

(4) Integrating current peace problems into history study.

E. the following three principles should be observed in the interpretation of various conflicting events in history and contemporary life.

(1) The principle of interaction and tolerance: we shall «stand in other's shoes» and conflicts can be solved through communication.

(2) The principle of mutual development and win-win situation: based on the mutual benefits in the long-term, students shall learn to seek win-win methods and solve conflicts by rationality and wisdom.

(3) The principle of integrity and equality: democracy, equality and realism rather than prejudice shall run through the class. Teachers should imagine that all the human beings are listening to your class.

On the whole, history education is an important phase in the peace building in East Asia. It not only tells students how to evaluate the past, but also how to face the future. An essential aspect in history education is to find a solution in the future rather than to disrupt the order in Asia due to historical hatred. Young people should be taught to solve problems by mutual understanding and for the sake of future peace and development of East Asia instead of national hatred. An important way to build trust between East Asian countries is to foster shared historical memory and thinking through history education. Common historical thinking serves as the base of future development and peace process if Asian nations want to cooperate as a union like European Union nations. History education and the solution of conflicts are inter-related with each other. To achieve future peace in East Asia, we must draw lessons from history, and history education is a starting point of regional cooperation. The young people will strive for peace when they are taught new historical outlook and historical truth. As a result, future peace in East Asia can be ensured through new generations.

Notes

1 See Lin, Shang li, 'From Regional Dispersiveness to Regional Advantage: the East Asia Strategy of China', in Peace Geography, Press of the Communication University of China, 2005, Page 190.

2 Asahi Shimbun, 15 August, 2003.

3 Liu, Jianping, 'Japanese's Consciousness of the War Responsibility', China Reading Weekly, November 9, 2000.

4 Huang, Ren Yu, Capitalism and the 21st Century, Shanlian Publishing house, Beijing, 1997, P.312.

5 See Shun, Ge, 'The War memory in Chinese and Japanese Medias', in The Complication and Development of Modernity in East Asia, Jiling People's Publishing house, 2002.

6 Wang, Xi, 'Globalization: a dilemma for Choice', Globalization Times, February 25, 2002.

7 Dai, Jin Hua, 'Witness and Eyewitness', in Reading, 1999, No.3.

8 See Kuang, Xin nian, 'Look for a lost vision', in Theory and Criticism of Literature and Art, 2003 No.2.

Бяо Янг

проф., исторический факультет, Университет восточного Китая (Шанхай, Китай)

Историческое образование как путь к мирному сосуществованию в Восточной Азии*

I. Схема конфликтов

Разрешение конфликта концепций является важным аспектом исторического образования. За последние десятилетия напряжение в отношениях восточноазиатских стран возрастает. В Китае, Японии и Корее стали популярными идеи национализма. В отношении учебников по истории и проблемы храма Ясукуни не было достигнуто компромисса. Восточная Азия, вероятно, станет еще одним Ближним Востоком в том, что касается расхождения исторических концепций. Основной причиной сложившейся ситуации является то, что эти страны придерживаются различных точек зрения на исторические события. Диспут об исторической памяти в Восточной Азии становится схемой конфликтов, и чем-то вроде спокойствия без уверенности, уверенности без спокойствия.

Причиной кризиса мира в Восточной Азии является ее «разобщенность» – роковое (слабое) место восточноазиатского общества. С исторической позиции ее современного развития, эта «разобщенность» не врожденная особенность, а выработанная черта. Идеологией Восточной Азии было конфуцианство. Нации были тесно связаны благодаря этой общей культуре. Постепенно была образована уникальная форма цивилизации и социальная система с Китаем, как центром. Однако в наше время единый социальный строй, существовавший благодаря общей культуре и стабильная социальная система были нарушены под влиянием западной цивилизации. Упадок Китая, европеизирование Японии и посягательства западных держав разрушили традиционную систему Восточной Азии, что позднее стало угрожать ее культурной целостности. Подъем Японии разрушил самобытный строй Восточной Азии. Японское вторжение и колонизация вызвали сильные протесты и антипатию со стороны покоренных ею соседей. В результате, самобытная духовная и эмоциональная связь в восточноазиатском обществе разрушилась. После Второй мировой войны помимо «железного занавеса», простиравшегося до Восточной Азии, появился «бамбуковый занавес», поделивший восточноазиатское общество на группы. В результате, единый социальный строй, сформировавшийся за период долгого исторического развития, был разрушен. Крушение социальной системы, эмоциональных связей и социального строя раздробило единую Восточную Азию на отдельные части.

Поэтому, за последние десятилетия, несмотря на то, что мы поражаемся чудесам экономики, происходящим в Восточной Азии, мы можем наблюдать ее врожденный парадокс – парадокс между единством и разобщенностью. Единство относится к общим ценностям в истории и традициях восточноазиатского общества. Сила конфуцианства, направленная на развитие Восточной Азии, показывает, что современные восточноазиатские страны все еще разделяют присущее им единство и извлекают пользу из общей культуры. Однако в современной Восточной Азии единство не может служить противовесом разобщенности. «Разобщенность» означает различие или неравенство в социальном строе, несмотря на общность взглядов восточноазиатских стран. Она также относится к неравенству, с точки зрения концепции и духа, особенно конфронтации исторических концепций и неравенства идеологий. Единство – движущая сила общего развития восточноазиатского общества, тогда как разобщенность мешает Восточной Азии осуществлять свое влияние в мире. Сокрушительный эффект, вызванный конфронтацией исторических концепций, не только обнаруживает слабое место Восточной Азии, но также создает препятствие на пути к будущему миру. Таким образом, некая внутренняя сила, используемая в качестве движущей, является необходимостью для объединения восточноазиатского общества. Интеграция европейского сообщества является хорошим примером в этом отношении.

Страны Восточной Азии можно назвать «знакомыми незнакомцами». Мы, азиаты, склонны уважать так называемую западную цивилизацию и при этом презирать ближайших соседей. Своим спором об истории мы подвергаем опасности непрерывность цивилизации, которая не может быть прервана даже войной. Мы забываем самое прекрасное, что есть в Азии. Суммируя всю информацию о цивилизации Азии, ее можно описать, как «Мир и Любовь». Как писал в 20 веке японский историк Теншин Окакура, Азия – единая часть. Гималаи разделили две великие цивилизации – китайскую, характеризующуюся коллективизмом конфуцианства, и индийскую, характеризующуюся индивидуализмом буддизма. Но этот «снежный занавес» не может помешать распространению всеобщей любви, поддерживаемой странами Азии. Персидские поэмы, индийские размышления, китайская мораль, во всех них говорится о любви ради мира в Древней Азии. Это показывает, насколько важную роль играет общая историческая концепция в процессе обретения мира в Восточной Азии. Она делает дружбу между нациями крепче и объединяет людей.

У Восточной Азии хороший фундамент для дальнейшего развития. Главное, необходимо выйти из стадии «разобщенности» и соз­дать эффективное региональное преимущество с помощью объединения внутренней силы. Таким образом, Восточная Азия сможет поддерживать стабильность и безопасность посредством собственного регулирования и сотрудничества, а не внешних сил. Это региональное преимущество окажется значительным, как только будет достигнуто. Оно продвинет вперед всю Восточную Азию и, что более важно, увеличит всестороннее развитие в экономической, общественной, политической и культурной сфере. Поэтому страны Восточной Азии должны принять стратегические меры, особенно стратегическую концепцию для усиления культурного обмена между собой, и найти «общие ценности», что поможет дальнейшему развитию. Единство истории и культуры – важный источник установления регионального преимущества. В этом отношении, необходимо расширить границы культурного взаимообмена и изучить исторические источники во всей Восточной Азии, чтобы установить общую концепцию и основные ценности. Единство основных ценностей в истории и культуре является базой для мирного развития и установления регионального преимущества Восточной Азии.

II. Сопоставляя историческую память

С позиции китайского ученого, историческая память Китая характеризуется оптимизмом. У Китая есть особенность романтизировать свою историю. Иностранцев может смутить тот факт, что китайцы гордятся своими неудачами. Хотя Китай часто страдал от расколов, поражений и посягательств иностранных держав, китайцы до сих пор гордятся прошлым своей большой страны. И эта гордость часто становится критерием, по которому они судят о мировой истории. В эпоху, когда националистические идеи день за днем становятся все популярнее, именно через коллективную память китайцы выстраивают свой мир и понимают свое прошлое. Таким образом, историческая память романтизируется, и на нее смотрят с оптимизмом.

И, наоборот, в противоположность Китаю, историческая память в Японии характеризуется сильным реализмом и в большей степени пессимистична.

Изменение смысла революции: изменение исторического образования в Китае

Вместо мира, самая важная тема в истории современного Китая – революция. В китайском языке и в древние времена присутствовало слово «революция». Оно означало смену династии, т.е. имело абсолютно другое значение. А японцы впервые использовали это китайское слово для обозначения революции в ее современном значении. Затем китайское слово «революция», модифицированное японцами, получило вторую жизнь в современном Китае и укрепилось в повседневной жизни китайцев.

Слово «революция», в его современном значении, снова вошло в китайский язык с рассказами о Французской революции. «Краткий доклад об истории Франции» китайского ученого Ванг Тао, написанный в конце 19 века – первая китайская академическая книга об истории Франции, где впервые употреблено понятие Французская революция. Книга была написана на основе «Истории Франции» японского ученого Ока Сенджин и «Истории мира» Окамото Канске. Затем словосочетание «Французская революция» с его концепцией, взятой из работ японских ученых, сильно повлияло на китайское общество, а также на идеи революции в современном Китае. С тех пор в Китае начали преподавать и изучать Французскую революцию.

Основная тема исторического образования в Китае – революция, особенно Французская революция, революция в России и Китае. Возьмем в качестве примера преподавание и понимание Французской революции, значение слова «революция» меняется, что означает изменение исторического образования в Китае. Так как и Франция и Китай прошли через централизацию, физиократию и социальную революцию, по мнению некоторых китайских ученых, Китай может многому научиться из опыта процесса модернизации во Франции. Французская революция, революции в России и Китае отличаются по времени, географии, социальным предпосылкам и своим последствиям. Однако все эти революции произошли в континентальных странах и с помощью них пытались изменить аграрное общество и принять новое управление, используя политическую борьбу, в противоположность Америке, Японии и Германии, у которых почти не было помех на пути к установлению новой системы, из-за отсутствия строгой централизации. Поэтому, Французскую революцию в Китае рассматривают в качестве модели. А в историческом образовании Китая современной истории Франции придают особое значение.

Китайская Народная Республика была образована путем революции. На это повлияла революция в России, которая разразилась под влиянием Французской революции. Таким образом, Французская революция сильно повлияла на современный Китай. Кроме того, многие знаменитые лидеры китайской революции, например Чжоу Эньлай и Дэн Сяопин, учились во Франции, где они впервые приняли идеи коммунизма и стали осуществлять их на практике. Поэтому в историческом образовании в Китае так много места уделялось Французской революции, а особенно подчеркивалось ее значение во второй половине 20 века.

Однако, с наступлением 21 века, значение «революции» подвергли сомнению после ряда революционных событий, особенно «культурной революции», произошедших в Китае в 20 веке. Некоторые китайские ученые выдвинули лозунг «Попрощайся с революцией». Они подчеркивают, что 20 век в Китае – это период, когда революция и политика, как сокрушительная сила, контролировали все в китайском обществе. Революции действительно вызвали серьезные бедствия в Китае. Трудно поверить, что проблемы Китая можно решить посредством простого изменения надстройки и идеологии. Революции можно было бы избежать, если бы политика преобразования династии Цин была успешной. Эти ученые считают, что революции, с ее излишней страстью, часто не хватает логики, и она пытается разрушить все существующие системы и порядки, что препятствует развитию китайского общества. Они заключают, что мы должны заниматься вопросами реформирования и прогресса, а не революцией. В Китае не должно быть больше революций, ради экономического развития и благосостояния 1,2 млрд. человек, проживающих здесь.

С началом 21 века, работы, пересматривающие значение Французской революции, например «Старый порядок и революция» Токвиля и «Лекции о Французской революции» Актона, снова стали популярны в Китае. Некоторые китайские ученые соглашаются с тем, что революции в Англии и Америке были успешными, а Французская революция потерпела неудачу.

Славная революция и Война за независимость установили прочную демократическую конституционную систему правления. А Французская революция этого не достигла. Форма правления во Франции постоянно менялась. В течение 86 лет после революции было составлено 14 конституций, а это означает, что радикальные изменения происходили, в среднем, каждые 6-7 лет. Ни одна другая страна, кроме Китая, в 20 веке не имела больше неустойчивых форм режима, чем Франция. Сейчас некоторые китайские ученые считают, что постоянство политических форм в Японии и Германии сохраняется благодаря местному национализму и международной обстановке, в то время как Французская революция обязана своей неудачей философским ошибкам. Другими словами, неудача происходит из ошибок, допущенных во времена Французского Просвещения. Французские представители течения Просвещения придумали идеальное общество, управляемое разумом. По их мнению, революция – это воплощение этой мечты путем уничтожения старых традиций. В некотором смысле они считали все человечество своим врагом. Слишком тяжелая задача, возложенная ими на революцию, обрекла последнюю на провал.

В научных кругах Китая придерживаются мнения, что основная разница между Французской революцией и революциями в Англии и Америке в том, что последние были лишь политическими революциями или сменой правящей системы, в то время как Французская хотела изменить основы социального строя, ценности и образ жизни людей. Французские философы, пропагандирующие идеи Просвещения, так и не осознали основные парадоксальные черты своей теории. Они требовали свободы каждому. Однако достигнуть свободы в обществе, подверженном хаосу, нельзя. Невозможно создать на практике конституционную систему, если нет общих ценностей и все члены общества отделены от самого общества и от его традиций. Французская революция и другие революции, последующие ее примеру доказали, что попытка изменить общество при помощи политического насилия гибельна. Хаос и беспорядок обрекают революцию на провал.

Хотя переоценивание значения Французской революции ограничивается академической сферой в Китае, она имеет сильное влияние и на другие сферы. Возможно, она повлияет на историческое образование в Китае, и целью преподавания станет не революция, а мир.

С наступлением 20 века древнекитайское слово «революция», модифицированное в японском языке, получает новое значение, которое интерпретируется в контексте мировой истории. Из рассказов о Французской революции китайцы приняли новое значение, а также идеи, которые оно несет, и ввели его в практику. Однако с наступлением 21 века значение слова «революция» в Китае снова стало двусмысленным и даже меняется от положительного к отрицательному. Эта тенденция не только поменяет оценку китайским народом значения революции, она также сильно повлияет на понимание самого мира.